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Certainly one of the primary impacts
of the renewed interest in affect
within the humanities and social sciences has been the problematizing
of our traditional notions of social
construction or cultural causality.
The contention that the bulk of our
feelings appear tied to fairly robust
and physiologically instantiated “affect programs” has led humanities
theorists to challenge previously
dominant theories of social and ideological construction and to adopt
a more empathetic stance toward
research of the “hard sciences.” At
the same time, the works of canonical philosophers who have more traditional homes in the humanities,
such as Descartes, Aristotle, and
Spinoza—thinkers who wrote before the drawing of disciplinary lines
and who created theories that Affect
Effect contributor Michael A. Neblo
calls “psychologies with political
intent” (27)—have enjoyed a renaissance within the social sciences and
become for many a crucial adjunct
to unpacking empirical research on
autonomic responses. Much research
in both of these exchanges has revolved around the complex parsing
of cultural and subjective “triggers”
for affective experience in relation to
the material functions and response
mechanisms of the endocrine and
nervous systems.
The root causes for the turn to
affect, however, may be much easier
to map. One might, for instance,
chart the rise of interest in affect as a
response to the popularity of “post-
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human” theory over the past decade.
While many of the capacities previously taken as the unique domain
of humans have been replicated in
mechanical realms, affect has often
been positioned, as in the work of
N. Katherine Hayles, as a property
that remains singular to humanity.
Similarly, one could index the turn
to affect in relation to changes in the
technological resources and stylistics
of aesthetic media, such as cinema.
In this genealogy, a line could be
drawn tracing movements from
the early “cinema of attractions”
(e.g., Arrival of a Train at La Ciotat,
1896), to the birth of narrative film
proper (The Great Train Robbery,
1903), to the era of pastiche and
narrative recycling (to keep with the
train theme: Throw Momma from
the Train, 1987), and, finally, to the
popularity of films that stage a return of sorts to the cinema of attractions by targeting viewers’ affective
responses explicitly through the use
of nonlinear sequencing and other
devices (Trainspotting, 1996, and
subsequent films such as Run Lola
Run, 1998, and Requiem for a
Dream, 2000, analyzed by Jamie
“Skye” Bianco in her contribution to
Affective Turn). However, the shift
that intersects these others and informs some of the strongest work in
both of the anthologies under review
here is perhaps best described in
reference to political economy—
that is, if one takes the term “political economy” in its broadest sense to
describe both how value is created

within culture and the complicated
mediations between individual and
group identities within such a process. This genealogy might begin
with Adam Smith’s paradigmatic
gesture of “the invisible hand” of
the market (one that survives in
modified form today in free market
enthusiasm of the Hayekian variety).
It is this invention of Smith’s that
fascinated the young G.W.F. Hegel
and inspired the latter’s conception
of “the ruse of reason” to foreground
the complex interactions between
the conscious and unconscious motivations of the individual as well
as between the motivations of an
individual and the collective. This
latter structure, and in particular its
further transposition by Marx, is the
one most clearly being worked
through and against in the pages
of Affective Turn and Affect Effect,
while their contributors assay the
intensities of immaterial labor and
the influence of human physiology
on political belief and decision making in an era of post-ideological critical theory.
As the title suggests, Affective
Turn positions recent work on affect
in the humanities and social sciences
as a pivotal shift comparable to earlier “turns” (“linguistic,” “ethical,”
etc.) in these disciplines, and there
is much that is convincing and provocative about the work collected
here to justify this comparison. All
of the essays were originally composed while their authors were completing doctoral work in such areas
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as sociology, women’s studies, and
cultural studies, and participating in
projects administered by the Center
for the Study of Women and Society
at the Graduate Center of the City
University of New York. As such,
they tend to share a focus on a fairly
narrow and consistent set of sources
for their theoretical foundations,
most notably the works of Gilles
Deleuze, philosophers that were
important to Deleuze’s conception
of affect (primarily Baruch Spinoza
and Henri Bergson), and thinkers
who at least in some way made their
bones as interpreters of Deleuze or
these other philosophers (Brian
Massumi, Manuel DeLanda, Keith
Ansell Pearson). These relatively
uniform influences are balanced,
however, by a dedication to taking
the capaciousness of the Spinozistic
definition of affect as both capacities
to affect and be affected quite seriously. As editor Patricia Ticineto
Clough writes in her excellent and
thorough introduction, in this collection “affect is not only theorized
in terms of the human body” but is
also “theorized in relation to the
technologies that are allowing us
both to ‘see’ affect and to produce
affective bodily capacities beyond
the body’s organic-physiological
constraints” (2). Similarly, contributors spill a large amount of critical
ink foregrounding what Clough refers to as “the intensification of selfreflexivity” in information technologies, human bodies, media systems,
and hypercapitalism that make it

difficult to diagram the boundaries
between the personal and collective
operations of affect (terrain also covered in somewhat more restricted
terms in Clough’s 2000 book, Autoaffection: Unconscious Thought
in the Age of Technology). Overall,
the contributors’ willingness to extend their theorizing of affect
beyond human subjectivity, and at
times into inorganic realms, is salutary during a time when discussion
of affect is often dominated by a
focus on subjective experience.
This admixture of the human
and nonhuman is at the heart of
the first two of four subject clusters
that organize Affective Turn, coded
by Clough as mapping conceptual
shifts “From Traumatized Subjects
to Machinic Assemblage” and “From
the Body as Organism to NonOrganic Life.” Both categories anchor contributions that attempt to
think of subjectivity as “beyond” or
otherwise in opposition to the limits
of psychoanalysis and performativity theory. The most stylistically
experimental chapters in Affective
Turn are gathered under these clusters, including autoethnographic
and performative accounts of such
topics as child abuse, geographical
displacement, and suicide. These
pieces juxtapose and integrate various registers of response to their subjects, such as the switching between
personal experience, poetry, and her
relatives’ histories in Hosu Kim’s
“The Parched Tongue,” which diagrams the traumas of migration
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across several generations. Deborah
Gambs’s “Myocellular Transduction:
How My Cells Trained My BodyMind” likewise combines poetic
components, autoethnographic descriptions of the author’s physical
training, media accounts of marathon training, and glosses of Massumi’s work in describing mindbody reflexivity on both a societal
and personal level. The authors of
these chapters defer from offering
explicit conclusions or arguments;
rather, their thick descriptions of
affective experience attempt to perform the affective responses and
experiences under review as much
as they work to articulate them
within a critical framework. A similar methodology was also recently
explored in Kathleen Stewart’s
autoethnographic Ordinary Affects
(2007), and as in that book, these
segments in Affective Turn provide
an addition and counterbalance to
the more traditionally analytical and
argumentative material within those
same chapters and the others within
the collection.
Entries in the other two subject
clusters organizing Affective Turn
take a more systemic approach to
their treatments of affect and the
uses of affect theory, organizing
their interventions in relation to
two intersecting models for mapping affect within social and economic systems: Deleuze’s late-life
writings on Foucault and power,
and autonomist–influenced work
on affective labor (most notably the

essay of the same name by Michael
Hardt, who also penned the preface
to Affective Turn, and his frequent
collaborator Antonio Negri’s “Value
and Affect”). The former cluster,
described by Clough as responding
to the movement “From Discipline
and Representation to Control and
Information,” engages the transition from a Foucaultian model of
disciplinary power focused on confined sites of training and the
creation of relatively “stable” rolebased identities, to its retrofitting
in Deleuze’s work on “control societies,” in which value can be increasingly extracted from any kind of
subjectivity or bodily capacities
whatsoever.
Though the responses to this
pairing are admirably diverse
(including Jamie “Skye” Bianco’s
provocative tracking of control
mechanisms in the “non-human
temporalities” of contemporary cinema and Karen Wendy Gilbert’s
dizzying attempt to extend biophilosophical conceptions of the
body in relation to symbiogenesis,
cell phase-state, and bioenergetics),
the chapter that perhaps most
productively pursues this line is
Greg Goldberg and Craig Willse’s
“Losses and Returns: The Soldier in
Trauma.” Goldberg and Willse take
up one of Foucault’s primary examples of the subject of disciplinary
power—the soldier—to index the
coexistence of disciplinary and control models of power used in extracting value from U.S. soldiers serving
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in Iraq. As Goldberg and Willse
document, the capacities of the solider-body are still certainly worked
the same “disciplinary” way they
have been for centuries—U.S. soldiers continue to receive extensive
training and drilling in bodily comportment, as well as psychological
“preparation” for the violence and
trauma they may inflict and experience. However, they also have ears
for how these techniques are overlapped by strategies and practices
more in line with the “lighter and
faster” forces of “control” (a coexistence also marked, the authors’ note,
in Foucault’s own late-life writings
on biopower). On the one hand,
training is no longer confined to
physical sites, or even to individuals
already inside the military, as exemplified by Goldberg and Willse’s
description of America’s Army, the
video game/recruiting tool for that
branch of the armed forces (or, as
stated on the official website, a
system that “provides young Americans with a virtual web-based environment in which they can explore
Army career opportunities within
an entertaining setting that is tailored to their interests and aptitudes”). On the other hand, the
growing number of traumatized
and injured bodies created by the
war has also produced its own regime of biopolitical negotiations
(such as the calculus that returning
soldiers must consider when requesting antidepressants to cope with the
trauma they have experienced, or in

navigating the bureaucracy of disability benefits) as well as much
value for growing biopolitical economies of therapy (both physical and
mental) and medical research. As
the authors argue in alluding to the
double meaning of their essay’s title,
such phenomena force us to rethink
our traditional conception of critically wounded soldiers “as the loss of
a fighting force” as one in which “the
trauma of the Iraq war . . . offers
unexpected returns: opportunities
such as the financialization of health,
illness, and injury . . . as well as the
development of new rehabilitative
technologies, all of which offer
the possibility to modify and extend
governmental management and the
administration of mutations of life”
(281). Although the bureaucratic
torment of returning soldiers and
the uses of wounded soldier-bodies
for scientific research have been
very much in the news, Goldberg
and Willse’s contribution is notable
for its deft analysis of both the coexistence of “disciplinary” and “control processes” within contemporary biopower and, more generally,
the value of Foucaultian theories
of biopower in thinking through
affect and affective economies. During a time in which the party line on
Foucault’s biopower writings configures it as either a contradiction
or correction to his earlier work on
discipline, and the most notable use
of Foucault’s late work in relation to
affect theory has been Eve Kosofsky
Sedgwick’s positioning of the popu-
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larity of (at least some interpretations of) his “repressive hypothesis”
as one of the primary reasons one
must turn away from such work and
toward affect theory, such an intervention is both timely and welcome.1
Similar concerns over changes
in training and the organization
of work form the core of chapters
organized as responses to theories of
affective labor, which take up fashion models (Elizabeth Wissinger),
health-care workers (Ariel Ducey),
unpaid domestic laborers (David
Staples), and sex workers (Melissa
Ditmore) as subjects. Wissinger
presents fashion models as “key
players in the expansion of an affective economy, including its global
economy” through personal interviews with those in the industry
and a carefully crafted genealogy of
how the growth of model “celebrity”
proceeded in conjunction with media and information technologies
(233). For Wissinger, the modeling
industry is a key site for diagnosing
affective economies and modeling
one of the best examples of “the
effort to amplify and modulate
the flow of affect by embodying
an image or stimulating an energy
not immediately assimilable to consciousness” (243). Ducey similarly
makes deft use of personal interviews
in her treatment of health-care workers who not only perform clear examples of affective labor but also are
at the center of an affective economy
of education and training organized
around the desire for attributing

“meaningfulness” to that occupation.
As Ducey writes, opportunities for
education and training for healthcare workers offer a largely paradoxical resource for those pursuing
a vocation that is “more than just a
job”: “The training and education
industry can offer itself as a vehicle
for achieving meaning while the
industry’s existence—in fact, its regeneration and growth—depends
on the fact that meaning perpetually
vanishes” (195). As Ducey goes on to
argue, the cultivation of this desire
often obscures concern over the inequitable wage of health-care workers, while at the same time the “profits” of this desire accumulate around
the health-care “industry” rather
than its practitioners.
These chapters on affective labor
also most explicitly foreground the
difficulty of integrating affect into
theories of political economy and
possibilities for political action. Although contributors ably map how
affect creates value in contemporary
capitalism, they struggle somewhat
with determining the value of affect—or, more precisely, the value of
affect theory—in changing our
responses to economic and cultural
practices. Granted, many of the
authors explicitly position their
projects as diagnostic rather than
prescriptive in nature. Wissinger concludes by suggesting that thinking
about “preindividual forces of affectivity and bodily energies” provides
a “new angle” on how imagining
technologies constitute bodies (255).
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Ducey similarly defers focus on possible responses to affective labor, arguing that since affect “is not subject
to the usual forms of measurement
and analysis . . . the political responses
its modulations call forth are emergent and unpredictable” (205). The
essays that do focus most explicitly
on such responses are, ironically,
those in which theories of affective
labor are a starting-off point rather
than a consistent resource in their
analysis. As such, their conclusions
tend to follow descriptions of the
new importance of affect in economics and culture with fairly traditional suggestions for intervention
based on collective organization and
political recognition. For example,
Melissa Ditmore concludes her
sharp analysis of the Dunbar Mahila
Samanwanya Committee, an organization that promotes the safety
and welfare of its sixty thousand
Indian sex workers, by noting irony
“in the fact that the DMSC works
with immaterial affect laborers in
the world’s oldest, but as yet unrecognized, profession to advance their
cause at a far deeper, more meaningful and effective level than has been
achieved by recognized workers in
affect labor” (184). However, the
productive interventions identified
here are fairly traditional, and because of the relative singularity of
what Ditmore calls “the world’s
oldest form of affective labor” (both
generally and particularly in India,
where the laws governing sex work
are fairly ambiguous), it is difficult

to imagine how the examples given
here might be translated to other
forms of affective labor (such as
health care, “women’s work,” and
modeling, to use the other industries
assayed in this subject cluster) (170).
Similarly, David Staples contributes
a notable argument that affective
labor is best approached through a
Bataillean general economy rather
than a restricted political economy,
but his conclusion suggests that the
best response to the devaluation of
“women’s work” is to quantify the
time of that labor; drawing on
Derrida’s work on gift economies,
Staples states that although the “ethical duty or responsibility implicit in
child care cannot be measured, or
estimated, or valorized as such,” the
“time of child care can,” and can also
be rewarded based on its duration,
a measure he sees occurring in the
commodification of child care generally and in the 1999 rewriting
of the constitution of Venezuela in
particular (145). Both the conclusions marking the unpredictability
of future response and those relying
on fairly traditional strategies of
intervention speak to the relative
difficulty of following up analyses
of the operations of affect with
techniques for mobilizing affect
productively.
All of which is to say, though
Affective Turn does a better job of
introducing readers to the central issues surrounding the study of affect
in the humanities and social sciences
than any single work I am aware of,
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its value comes as much from the
way it underscores sticking points
or aporias in this work as from the
individual accomplishments of its
contributors. Indeed, the above concerns are perhaps better taken not as
criticisms of Affective Turn but of
the segment of “the affective turn”
to which the authors are most commonly responding—work, notably
that of Sedgwick and Massumi, that
has positioned affect theory as a
productive alternative to “critique”
in its traditional sense: a “way out”
of the ostensibly moribund focus
on relationships of dominance and
subversion and the identification
of this or that phenomenon as
ideologically or socially constructed.
Certainly such an endeavor has had
a salutary effect on the contemporary critical terrain, both through its
emphasis on the often-neglected
role of human physiology and nervous processes in human subjectivity
and ideation, as well as its antagonism toward the idea that beliefs
and predispositions can somehow
be made privative or defused when
exposed to rational critique. However, the question of how to deploy
these insights within the traditionally “rational” ecology of research in
the humanities and social scientists
has proven to be a thornier issue.
One could, for instance, abandon
traditional registers of academic criticism, as do the more experimental
and autoethnographical chapters
in Affective Turn. These works remain somewhat unsatisfying, how-

ever, because even though they may
succeed in producing a “feeling” of
or for the affective phenomena under review, the motivational or persuasive import to the work is much
less clear. One could also simply
emphasize the importance of affect
as a critique of “critique” itself, as do
Goldberg and Willse, who in their
piece marvel that even after the
impact of deconstruction, “academic
scholarship continues to engage
media objects as exterior, applying
theory against them to interpret or
reveal their meanings and truths”
(265). Similarly, Bianco positions her
work as an intervention into the
dominance of psychoanalytical and
ideological approaches to film criticism. Yet, I take it, though such
paradigms have not necessarily entered “straw man” territory at this
time, we are seeing diminishing returns on such calls as they continue
to multiply. Perhaps most telling
is the emphasis, behind these approaches and throughout much
of the work within the volume, on
affect as not only primary in many
dimensions of experience but also,
unlike experience itself, ultimately
irreducible and “unrepresentable.”
Such an emphasis makes the critical edge of the majority of chapters
more what we might code “aesthetic”
than rhetorical, or more focused on
the description of affects and affective processes rather than their possible manipulation. The influence for
this approach, it seems, is at least
partially Massumi’s “The Autonomy
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of Affect,” which looms large over
much of Affective Turn. The terms
and phrases used there to describe
affect and affective “intensity”—
“unassimilable,” “outside expectation and adaptation” (85), “in excess
of any narrative or function line”
(87), “irreducible excess” (87)—are
recurrently paraphrased and alluded to throughout the volume.2 In
Affective Turn, as in Massumi’s
article, such depictions, as much as
they are meant to be in some way
“post-postmodern,” seem to at least
equally take us back to a certain type
of pseudo-modernist aestheticism.
Indeed, the references cited above
ring most clearly as descriptions of
“the sublime” more than anything
else. Perhaps, as Negri contends in
another oft-cited work that also
emphasizes the “immeasurability”
of affect, “the Sublime has become
normal.”3 However, it seems we have
yet to find the way to move from
describing affective processes in
aesthetic terms to producing strategies for mobilizing those processes,
or, perhaps more precisely, how we
might use our recognition of the affective dimension of politics to leverage affect for political purposes.
For this reason it was immensely
valuable to read Affective Turn in
conjunction with Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political
Thinking and Behavior, which takes
a rather different approach to affect
theory in both method and perspective. The focus for the majority
of the contributions is on discrete

processes of affective response, many
of which are empirically or clinically
assayed by the authors and related to
current research in psychology and
neuroscience. The majority of the
authors are also much more modest
in their claims for the difference
made by using affect theories of
motivation and decision making
as opposed to other models. For
instance, Peter R. Nardulli and
James H. Kulinski, though noting
the “enrichment” provided through
attention to emotion in their analysis
of the influence of anxiety on political desires, candidly conclude that
omitting this focus would have produced no substantial change in their
predictions (a conclusion they take
to foreground a need to be wary of
translating micro-level operations
of affect to higher-level political
patterns). Contributors to Affect Effect additionally draw on a much
more diverse set of sources for their
affective theories, many of which
are listed in the four-page chart included in the editors’ introduction
and covering ground from William
James’s work on affective tagging to
contemporary psychiatry.
However, the most sustained engagement throughout Affect Effect
is the variety of responses to the
theory of “affective intelligence” developed by coeditor George E. Marcus in 1988 and expanded more recently by Marcus in The Sentimental
Citizen: Emotion in Democratic
Politics (2002),4 and by Marcus and
coeditors W. Russell Neuman and
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Michael MacKuen in their book
Affective Intelligence and Political
Judgment (2000).5 Drawing on research into the brain’s limbic region,
affective intelligence theory posits
two primary systems driving political
thinking. The “dispositional” system,
maintained by familiarity and the
positive affects of enthusiasm, motivates individuals to continue relying
on their existing conceptions and
perspectives. The “surveillance” system, triggered by unfamiliar and
uncertain contexts and the concomitant negative affect of anxiety,
motivates people to break with habituated responses, seek additional
information, and engage in more
deliberative decision making. As
Marcus, Neuman, MacKuen, and
Luke Keele write in their contribution to the collection, affective intelligence theory departs from the
conventional thinking of theories
of rational choice or bounded rationality by suggesting that while rationality is “critical to the managing
of uncertain conditions,” it is “not
well suited to the familiar realm of
habit,” given its relative inefficiency
in relation to the scarcity of available
human cognitive resources (127). As
an intervention into research on political thinking, affective intelligence
theory is perhaps most notable for
foregrounding how affect can be
leveraged to explore the context or
conditionality, what the above authors call the “important ‘if then’
component,” that drives a person’s
responses to political stimuli.

This emphasis on context and the
feedback that takes place between
the body and thought as well as
between disposition and novelty is
reflected in the definition of affect
and emotion (terms used interchangeably in the volume) applied
in Affect Effect. As the editors write,
contributors identify affect as an
“evolved cognitive and physiological response,” or, drawing on the
work of psychologist Klaus Scherer’s work, the simultaneous recruitment of mental and somatic resources that occurs in reaction to
events that appear to have significance to the individual experiencing
them (9). Affective intelligence theory is also central to the sections on
“micro” and “macro” models of political behavior that form the bulk of
the collection, and chapters in these
areas are largely dedicated to testing,
refining, and extending the theory’s
contentions. In the section on micro
models, David P. Redlawsk, Andrew J. W. Civettini, and Richard R.
Lau argue that more attention needs
to be paid to the precise thresholds
guiding what impact affects such as
enthusiasm and anxiety will have on
the information-seeking behavior
and political judgment of voters.
They also (as do Leonie Huddy,
Stanley Feldman, and Eric Cassese
in their chapter) attempt to draw a
clearer distinction between affects of
anxiety and anger (often lumped
together as “negative emotion” in
research into affective intelligence)
and the differing responses they can
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provoke. As Huddy, Feldman, and
Cassese write in reference to their
study of responses to war in Iraq,
anger promotes a reduced perception of the risks of the war and
support for military intervention,
whereas anxiety largely heightens
perceptions of risk and reduced support (228). Anger, as well as fear, is
also a central concern for Ted Brader
and Nicholas A. Valentino, who
study the self-reported feelings of a
group of white Americans toward
increasing immigration and map
them in relation to party identification and other categories relating to
“symbolic dispositions” (such as
prejudices and group identity) and
“material circumstances” (such as
economic interests). Marion R. Just,
Ann N. Crigler, and Todd L. Belt
take up the study of a different affect
that has also been underthematized
in affective intelligence research—
hope—and use it to suggest that
a more interactive (rather than dualistic) view of cognition and interactive is necessary (as do Michael L.
Spezio and Ralph Adolphs earlier
in the volume). Though none of
these entries necessarily contradict
the foundations of affective intelligence theory, they do a stellar job
of refining those contentions and
identifying areas where more research is needed and where sharper
conceptions need to be drawn.
One of these areas is of course
how affective intelligence might
need to be thought of differently
when considering the electorate or

public as a whole rather than the
specific responses of individuals or
small groups being studied. The
entries on macro models ably navigate this difficult ground while also
illustrating more attention to the
particulars of how information and
appeals are disseminated in public
discourse. Doris Graber’s chapter
uses monthly Pew surveys from
1986 to 2003 to identify which news
stories most profoundly captured
the attention of the public. Although
her conclusion—that stories about
events resulting in massive loss of
life or physical damage were the
most affecting—is not necessarily
surprising, it puts a finer point on
arguments made elsewhere in the
volume foregrounding the importance of fear and anxiety in the
political tenor of the public, and
Graber pays admirable attention to
how particular components of media coverage (the use of sound, the
technical quality of the footage, etc.),
in addition to their subject matter,
influence impact. Also of note is
David C. Leege and Kenneth D.
Wald’s chapter on the role of “cultural identification” in party strategies and the importance of demographic targeting in campaigning.
The authors commendably pay equal
attention to “the way elites politicize
appeals and the manner in which
voters process these appeals” (294),
and their study of the primary examples under review—the wooing
of white evangelicals by Republicans
and white business and professional
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women by Democrats—is equally
meticulous in charting how large
swathes of the electorate have shifted
priorities from their economic interests to their cultural “values” and
identifications. While drawing significantly on affective intelligence
theory, Leege and Wald also suggest
the need to extend that theory’s
findings to account not just for the
defection of party partisans but
also for the increasing importance
campaign strategists place on “demobilizing” or influencing the opposing party’s faithful to stay home
on Election Day (315).
Multiple chapters in the volume
wrestle with what I take to be one
of the more striking or unsettling
conclusions derived from research
into physiological and affective
functioning in relation to politics:
the automatic or even “machinic”
processes that drive the majority
of political behavior. On the one
hand, as mentioned in the introduction to this review, affect is often
deployed, particularly in the humanities, as a distinctive criterion to
preserve human singularity against
artificial information systems and
processes. Similarly, as Marcus,
Neuman, and MacKuen reveal in
Affective Intelligence and Political
Judgment, their theory was largely
anticipated and inspired by Herbert
A. Simon’s 1967 article “Motivational and Emotional Controls of Cognition,” in which Simon introduces his concern with the impact
of emotion on human thinking in

reference to debates over the differences between human and mechanical “intelligence.”6 However,
subsequent research of affect has
somewhat paradoxically underscored the similarities between at
least some major parts of human
behavior and “mechanical” processing.
Take, for example, John A. Bargh
and Tanya L. Chartrand’s “The
Unbearable Automaticity of Being”
(an article not included but multiply
cited in Affect Effect), which argues
that “most of daily life is driven
by automatic, nonconscious mental
processes” that develop from “the
frequent and consistent pairing of
internal responses with external
events.”7 Among other research, the
authors review a number of studies
(by themselves and others) on the
effects of stereotypes on behavior in
support of their thesis. For instance,
subjects “primed” with words relating to stereotypes of the elderly
(“Florida,” “sentimental,” etc.) subsequently behaved in line with the
stereotype (walking slowly down
hallways, having difficulty with
their short-term memory). In another series of experiments, participants were subliminally presented
with the faces of young African
Americans; their subsequent be
havior was markedly more hostile
(as opposed to the control groups in
the experiments), presumably based
on their conceptions of that group.
Given this last example, some readers
might take Bargh and Chartrand as
being a tad blithe in their conclusion
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that we should consider “automatic”
affective processes as “mental butlers” acting “in our service and best
interests” and who “know our preferences . . . so well that they anticipate and take care of them for us,
without having to be asked” (476).
Responses by authors of Affect
Effect to the role of such “automaticity” and affect as a whole in explicit
relation to political behavior tend
toward a mixed tone of concern
and resignation. For instance, Dan
Cassino and Milton Lodge, responding to the conclusion that the “evaluation of social objects and, perhaps,
of most of our mental experience is
automatic,” write: “Affect may be
more efficient than other means of
processing, and it may be the only
avenue open for many citizens. It is
also easily fooled, however, and
can easily lead us to fool ourselves.
Our mere likes and dislikes can
tell us something about a political
figure, but they become dangerous
when they become reasons unto
themselves. Moreover, the political
appeals made to us are increasingly
designed to appeal to affect, rather
than reason, and, in so doing, may
mislead us even more” (121).
These responses are appropriate,
given limitations on attention and
cognitive resources, but research on
“automaticity” might also goad us to
rethink the treatment of affective
theory in the humanities, where, as
Clare Hemmings argues, several influential theorists—Hemmings’s
primary targets here are Sedgwick

and Massumi—tend to foreground
what she calls “the optimism of
affective freedom” while associating
the negative aspects of affective processing as part of “the pessimism
of social determinism” that affect
theory is supposed to free us from.8
More specifically, a focus on the automatic or machinic nature of affective response might help us rethink
concrete strategies for the strategic
manipulation of affect for political
purposes, a point I return to below.
The final section of Affect Effect
presents future directions for research and outreach. Rose McDermott contributes an entry on the
need to more fully integrate neuroscience research into our theories of
the interaction between affect and
cognition. Neuroscience can be a
particularly rich resource for political psychology, McDermott argues,
because it provides clues to how we
process and relate to our past affective experiences, and “the process of
memory encoding and activation
may be as important for understanding relevant political processes as accurately understanding the actual
emotional experience” (397). A
chapter by Arthur Lupia and Jesse
O. Menning focuses on the potential
for combining game theory and
theories of affect. This combination
may seem an unlikely one, as game
theory traditionally takes rational
choice as primary, a contention usually troubled in affect theory. However, the authors write, game theory
often provides a fuller appreciation
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of the importance of the emotional
reactions of players than it is given
credit for, and, I take it, given the
continued popularity of largely
computer model–driven game theoretic scholarship in mainstream
political science research, the integration of affect theories into this
field has much potential.
Perhaps the most provocative
entry in this category (as well as the
volume as a whole) is a chapter on
“The Affect Effect in the Very Real
World of Political Campaigns” authored by Dan Schnurr. In addition
to being an academic researcher and
teacher, Schnurr also practices what
the editors term (in good humor)
“the black art” of campaign consulting (335). He writes that his two
occupations have very different
motivations—“a researcher wants
to learn, and a practitioner wants to
win”—as well as often dim views of
each other’s members: consultants
taking academics to be “ivory-tower
idealists,” and academics just as
likely to view consultants as “poorly
educated vocational workers” (356).
Schnurr very carefully and compellingly relates the specific arguments
made in previous chapters about the
role of affect in politics to his own
work in, and reflections on, various
campaigns. This comparison is of
course a very useful and timely one,
given the focus on affective appeals
and the “authenticity” of candidates
in U.S. elections over the past decades. Indeed, as I write these words,
pundits have come to the near

unanimous conclusion that Hillary
Clinton’s surprise win in the 2008
New Hampshire primary race can be
attributed to voters’ positive response
to the “vulnerability” or sensitivity
she displayed during a teary-eyed
appearance at a campaign function
a few days earlier. Earlier in the
week Bob Wickers, a consultant for
Mike Huckabee’s campaign, was
quoted as claiming one of the major
impacts of the wins by both Huckabee and Barack Obama in the Iowa
Caucus was how it showed voters
“it was ‘okay’ to vote for the candidate they find appealing,” regardless
of the candidate’s relative lack of
experience.9
Schnurr focuses, as do the majority of contributors of Affect Effect,
on the success of such emotional appeals over more traditional evidencebased strategies, but he leverages his
consulting experience to also illustrate the importance of niche campaigning and demographic targeting. His arguments, presented as
a series of lessons ranging from
“Candidate Biography Reinforces
Message Credibility” to “Never Underestimate a Clinton,” provide insight into many specific strategies
of recent campaigns, such as George
W. Bush’s infamous “Mission Accomplished” appearance and John
Kerry’s photo opportunity while
obtaining a hunting license. Schnurr
concludes by returning to his relatively unique position among contributors to the collection as both an
active consultant and, he adds in the
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interest of a “full disclosure,” a
registered Republican. Urging his
colleagues to “put aside their own
concerns and prioritize the spread of
knowledge over the achievements of
their own political preferences” (374),
he offers a fairly traditional positioning of such knowledge as capable of
producing both “good” and “evil”
effects. More interesting, though,
may be an admission Schnurr makes
just before this conclusion: “I have
reconciled myself with the idea that
Democratic students in my classes
will probably apply the lessons I
have taught toward the advancement of political goals of which I am
a dedicated opponent” (374). Many
affect theorists in the humanities
with progressive political goals have
underscored the greater acumen of
political conservatives in affective
political strategizing. For instance,
Massumi ends “The Autonomy of
Affect” by mentioning that in North
America members of “the far right”
rather than the “established left” have
been more attuned to the political
potential of affect (105–06); Lauren
Berlant has somewhat gloomily
argued that one of the lessons of
Kerry’s failed presidential bid is
the difficulty of translating Bush’s
“shamelessness” about his record
and decisions to leftist political strategies that would seem to necessarily
have to focus more on the ambiguity
and complexity of political decision
making.10 What’s often unspoken
in such calls, even as it seems to
be foregrounded in treatments of

the affectivity and “automaticity”
of contemporary politics, is that the
appropriation of affectively attuned
strategies from the right and for the
left may require the adoption of practices often taken to be manipulative,
deceitful, or contradictory to the values behind political objectives—that
the call for “post-criticality” in passing beyond traditional concerns
of how practices may “enforce” or
“resist” the dominant order may
require the sacrifice of a certain
ethical clarity for us to move from
descriptive accounts of affect to rhetorical strategies for manipulating
these forces.
As a whole, Affect Effect, much
as Affective Turn, provides an excellent introduction to the contours of
current thought on the role of affect
and the affective processes of the
body, one that often appears all the
more elusive for having a material
“location” in human physiology.
Such a configuration often makes
affect appear both ubiquitous and
comprehensively unaccountable, a
replacement of the “invisible hand”
of rational chance with the “invisible gland” of affective processes
now driving political economy. Both
of these volumes are excellent examples of the difficulties of such
accounting and have much to offer
in regard to the possibilities for
future work.
—Wayne State University
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